As part of a preview to our new publication ‘OnCohesion’ Martin Coward examines the new wave of terrorist violence in Europe that focuses on crowded public spaces and low-tech weapons – and asks if countermeasures aimed at protecting us are generating physical and social barriers to community and cohesion?

• Examples of physical countermeasures include the concrete barriers installed around Westminster and around Christmas markets across the UK. Designed initially to prevent car and truck bombs from reaching their target, they have now become a way of protecting public spaces from attackers who try to drive vans and cars at pedestrians.
• There are doubts about the ability of countermeasures to prevent attacks – they are a visible way of protecting symbolic spaces but it is impossible to protect every public space in a city. Physical countermeasures can displace attacks into less well-defended areas.
• The implementation of protective measures may be aimed at reassuring citizens while concrete barriers will prevent car or truck attacks, they will not protect against knife, gun, or suicide bomb attacks. On the one hand, physical countermeasures may give communities a false sense of safety. On the other, they may actually increase levels of fear.
• could invisible measures have more protective value than hard countermeasures – For example, city planners can change road layouts to prevent cars and vans from accelerating to the speed needed to carry out attacks on public spaces. Similarly, planters, benches and retracting bollards can be used instead of concrete barriers.
• Prevention rests on community initiatives to prevent violent extremism. How can we have community trust unless everyone feels welcome in public spaces?

The bombing of an Ariana Grande concert at the Manchester Arena on May 22, 2017, has been seen as part of a new wave of terrorist violence in Europe that started with attacks in Paris in 2015. The hallmarks of this violence have been attacks on the public spaces of cities using low-tech, simple weapons (home-made explosives, guns, knives and vehicles). European cities seem to face a future of unpredictable, low-cost and hard to detect attacks. This trend towards targeting crowded places filled with families has alarmed city residents. Responses have typically focused on protection, detection and prevention. But are the countermeasures aimed at protecting us generating physical and social barriers to community and cohesion?

Protecting our cities

The vulnerability of crowded public spaces is not a new concern, especially in the UK. Following unsuccessful attacks on London and Glasgow airport in 2007, a government review led by Lord West proposed a series of measures to increase the protection for infrastructure and crowded spaces. This was driven by the concern that terrorism is turning to so-called soft targets – defenceless urban residents often in transport hubs (e.g. train stations, airports) symbolic buildings (e.g. Houses of Parliament) or places of leisure (e.g. concert venues, cafes).

The response has been a mixture of physical and less visible countermeasures as well as visibly armed policing. Examples include the concrete barriers installed around Westminster and around Christmas markets across the UK, intended to prevent vehicle attacks. Designed initially to prevent car and truck bombs from reaching their target, they have now become a way of protecting public spaces from attackers who try to drive vans and cars at pedestrians. Similarly, the increase in armed police officers (and the use of military forces to supplement these when high levels of terrorist alert are reached) are designed to deter attacks in crowded places and at symbolic buildings.

What price are we paying?

There are, however, significant questions to be asked not only about the effectiveness of physical measures, but also about their impact on communities. Broadly speaking, these questions fall into three areas: the practical ability of physical countermeasures to achieve their goals; the psychology of such countermeasures; and their potential negative impact on communities.

Firstly, there are doubts about the ability of countermeasures to prevent attacks. Countermeasures are a very visible way of protecting symbolic spaces. However, governments are limited in the amount of such protection they can implement (cost and practicality being limiting factors). It is impossible to protect every public space in the city. Physical countermeasures can displace attacks into less well-defended areas.

Secondly, the implementation of protective measures may be aimed at reassuring citizens. However, this can have contradictory results. While concrete barriers will prevent car or truck attacks, they will not protect against knife, gun, or suicide bomb attacks. On the one hand, then, physical countermeasures may give communities a false sense of safety. On the other hand, they may actually increase levels of fear, acting as a visible cue to the public that they are under threat. For some this may reinforce the sense that a particular minority is to blame for this threat and reinforce negative stereotypes. Concrete barriers might be a visual prompt for negative sentiments such as Islamophobia.

Finally, physical countermeasures can segregate public space and have the potential to become exclusionary. Physical countermeasures around symbolic buildings such as the Houses of Parliament make them less accessible. This runs contrary to the public function of such buildings. Fencing off commercial spaces such as Christmas markets has the effect of segregating urban populations into those that have the means to be inside a particular space and those that don’t. And there have been accusations that physical countermeasures can be used to discriminate. For example, at any point where checks on pedestrians or road traffic are introduced, there is a risk that they can be used to target suspect communities. Such discrimination negatively affects community cohesion.

What can we do?

Responding to terrorist attacks raises important questions about the cohesion of urban communities. How can we implement measures that can help protect citizens without the potential to raise anxiety, segregate and/or lead to discrimination?

Two suggestions come to mind for Greater Manchester’s Preventing Hateful Extremism and Promoting Cohesion Commission to consider. Firstly, could invisible measures have more protective – if less symbolic – value than hard countermeasures? For example, city planners can change road layouts to prevent cars and vans from accelerating to the speed needed to carry out attacks on public spaces. Similarly, planters, benches and retracting bollards can be used instead of concrete barriers. Can urban planning design-in such prevention without the need for overtly defensive architecture? This requires imaginative thinking about the threats faced and the ways in which they can be mitigated in public spaces. Secondly, we must remember that prevention rests on community initiatives to prevent violent extremism. How can we have community trust unless everyone feels welcome in public spaces?

We need to think beyond the short term of physical protection in the immediate aftermath of attacks. City planners should create pedestrian spaces beyond the reach of vehicles (not simply separated by temporary, highly visible barriers). Surrounding public spaces with parks and water features, for example, creates inclusive spaces inaccessible to vehicle attacks.
Our cities will then be more open and plural in their look and feel and funds that would have been spent on harder visible security can be spent on community cohesion projects that tackle extremism at its root.